The recent bomb attacks at the Istanbul airport (28 June 2016), in a tourist cafe in Dhaka, Bangladesh (2 July), and in Bagdad (3 July) were part of a "Ramadan campaign" announced by the spokesman of the self-declared "Islamic State" caliphate in late May 2016.
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GIGA Working Papers ance in Syria and Iraq (Caris and Reynolds 2014) , its use of social media (Ajbaili 2015; Al Qassemi 2015; Berger and Morgan 2015; Klausen 2015) , its appeal to foreign fighters (Ahmed and Pisoiu 2014; Carter, Maher, and Neumann 2014; Franz 2015; Neumann 2015) , the risk that returnees pose for Western societies (Byman 2015) , its competition within the jihadist spectrum (Byman and Williams 2015) , its connectedness to Baathist networks (Reuter 2015a; Reuter 2015b) , its ideological parallels to Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia (Bunzel 2016) , and its global franchising of new IS cells (Azoulay 2015; Chinyong Liow 2016; Jones 2015) . Despite the extreme violence that has set IS apart from other global terrorist groups, little attention has been given to the group's specific use of this violence over the course of its development.
This article provides an in-depth account of the different forms of violence practised by IS and distinguishes between them in terms of their contextual and functional attributes. It analyses them in chronological order using a "cycle of violence" model which describes and dissects the transformation of IS violence, looking at the strategic shifts that have taken place during the three stages of this cycle and how these have been related to the group's rise and decline as a territorial entity.
Section 2 discusses how IS, in a first stage, utilised violence as a tactic to instigate sectarian hatred and mobilise Iraq's Sunni community against the Shia. Section 3 then outlines the group's use of violence as an instrument of expansion and rule. The following section examines the most recent stage of the Islamic State's violent tactics: its use of brutalisation and a fictitious expansion narrative as a survival strategy. The article's final section analyses IS's overarching cycle of violence and derives some general lessons from it.
First Stage: Terrorist Violence as an Instrument of Mobilisation
To understand the Islamic State's violent tactics, it is imperative to understand the group's roots as a jihadist militia that grew out of the 2003 US-led invasion and subsequent occupation, until 2011, of Iraq. In this first stage of the cycle of violence, the evolving al-Qaeda franchise used violence as a strategy to encourage the mobilisation of the Sunni community against the common enemies. The infamous Jordanian jihadist Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi spearheaded this mobilisation as a resistance movement to expel the Western "crusaders,"
to exterminate the Shia "rejectionist" (rafida) sect, to overthrow the newly formed, alien "Safawid" Iraqi government, and to castigate insubordinate Sunni Muslims. 2 These broad and extremist goals laid the foundation for thousands of attacks and suicide bomb attacks, 2 The Safawi dynasty ruled Iran between 1501 and 1722. It was engaged in a struggle for power with the Ottoman Empire over contemporary Iraqi territory. Today this pejorative term denounces a presumed Iranian expansionism into Arab territory. Calling Arab Shiites Safawids depicts them as betrayers of the Arab cause.
Denouncing Shiites as rafida (rejectionists) refers to their refusal to accept the first three caliphs as righteous caliphs. Both pejorative terms have come to be commonly used by Sunni Islamists and Arab nationalists to delegitimise Arab Shiites' Islamic beliefs and Arab national identity; see Siegel (2015) .
GIGA Working Papers 288/2016 which were executed on a nearly daily basis. Zarqawi was notorious for his role in the beheadings of Western hostages. The video recordings of these murders became infamous in the Western world due to the media attention they received. They sent the crucial message to all viewers that this jihadist group did not feel restrained by any moral barriers in striving for its ultimate goal of erecting an "Islamic State" in Iraq.
Zarqawi's primary aim, however, was to instigate a sectarian civil war against the Shia majority community, which had become Iraq's new political elite. Bomb attacks against religious processions, religious authorities, holy sites, and residential areas were intended to provoke Shiite retaliation towards the Sunni community. The heightened tensions resulting from these attacks were to act as a catalyst to estrange the two Muslim communities, igniting a sectarian civil war and ultimately mobilising Sunnis in self-defence. Evidence of this plan is contained in a letter from Zarqawi to al-Qaeda's vice leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, written in Waldmann, who states that it is "deemed to denote well prepared, shocking, and violent attacks against a political order from the underground. They should mainly spread insecurity and terror, but should also generate sympathy and support readiness" (Waldmann 1998: 12) .
AQI utilised violence to demonstrate its power and generate legitimacy by leading the Sunni community. In 2006, this newfound confidence led to its proclamation of an Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), even though it hardly controlled any territory at that time (Günther 2014 
Territorial Expansion into Syria and Iraq
In 2011 Baghdadi sent a segment of his organisation into Syria to participate in the ongoing civil war there. It formed the Nusra Front, the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, which became an important actor in the Syrian civil war and attracted many jihadists from all over the world.
In 2013 McLaughlin 2015) . ISIS also profited monetarily by seizing and selling the abandoned property of state employees and members of minority communities who had either escaped or been killed. It generated revenue by re-selling wheat, barley, and other stolen agricultural items. Other sources of funding included local revenues such as the jizya, an Islamic tax levied on non-Muslims as a kind of protection fee, and steadily rising duties on electricity and water.
ISIS also confiscated 20 to 50 per cent of the salaries of Iraqi government employees, which were still being paid by the central government. As of late 2014, ISIS had seized one-third of the most important archaeological sites and historical places in Iraq. It is believed that it has sold $100 million worth of antiquities (Hartmann 2015; Loveluck 2015) . In Mosul, surgeons were hired to extract and sell the organs from fallen fighters, injured persons, abandoned people, and individuals who had been kidnapped (Nassir al-Hassoun 2014). ISIS also made a profit by establishing a trafficking network in Raqqa that has sold approximately 5,000 Yazidi women and children into slavery.
Building the "Islamic State"
By the them. Now it was financially independent and could offer promising salaries to its fighters, whose incomes were much higher than those of local rebel fighters or the soldiers of the Syrian and Iraqi armies (Laub and Masters 2015) . It supported its fighters' families and delivered services to the general population. Such support included honeymoon and baby bonuses, as well as payments for the poor and the widowed.
In his first public speech, the Friday sermon of 4 July 2014 at the Grand Mosque of Mosul, "Caliph" Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared that all Muslims worldwide had a religious duty to leave the "abode of unbelief" (dar al-kufr) and to migrate to the abode of Islam, the Islamic State (Bunzel 2015) . This supposed obligation of Muslims to perform the hijra (emigration), in combination with the promise of an ever-expanding caliphate and alluring spoils of war, ensured a steady flow of new recruits from all over the world. In his audio message of 1 July Such promises attracted many disenfranchised youths from Western countries who preferred to leave behind their lives, which they saw as void of stable roots of identity or hope for a better future. The IS rhetoric provided these youths -who had often faced ethnic discrimination and unemployment and lived in a consumer world that only the affluent can enjoywith a vision of opportunity, mobility within the ranks, stardom, and the chance to be the vanguard of the Islamic State. It promised them a better life through the spoils of war, upwardly mobile career opportunities in the state administration, and celebrity in fightingwith the climax of becoming a "martyr" and thereby directly entering paradise. This narrative offered these young Muslims, so often the victims at home, the opportunity to participate in an apocalyptic battle, "the grand battle prior to the Hour" (al-malhama al-kubra) between the true believers and the infidels. 
Violence Evokes Resistance
The Islamic State is not a nation state in the modern sense -that is, with a defined territory and borders separating it from its neighbours -as it denounces the concept of human-made frontiers. This is evident in its constant threats towards states such as Iraq, Syria, Jordan, In summer 2015, the expansion of the Islamic State came to a halt, and IS even lost important areas of its territory (Strack 2015) .
A Downward Spiral of Defeat
Instead of the self-fulfilling prophecy of a permanently expanding Islamic empire, the loss of territory, income, and credibility has now plunged IS into a downward spiral. IS has failed to achieve its goal of absorbing neighbouring states such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel/Palestine, as it proclaimed it would do in the summer of 2014. Any military defeat and retreat from occupied territory will further undermine its promise of a permanently expanding caliphate and its self-styled image of being the chosen victors.
Once-supportive factors are now turning against the Islamic State. The multi-ethnicity that once brought together a global community with a shared fervour for the Syrian-Iraqi jihad is now fuelling competition, jealousy and intra-group rivalries (Souleimanov 2014 ). The confusion of multiple languages also represents a disadvantage on the battlefield. The European members, accused of being privileged with more comfortable houses, are said to complain about boring jobs and being used up for suicide missions. They accuse the locals of being ungrateful for their sacrifices, while the locals feel alienated by the arrogant foreigners.
Worldwide media attention has ebbed given the mere repetition of barbaric brutality, and meanwhile there are more defeats than successes to report on. The group's opponents have developed more effective technical means of countering suicide attacks, and groups once terrified by the invincible appearance of IS are now starting to take revenge. Moreover, hundreds of thousands of refugees have set out for central Europe, many of them fleeing the Islamic State, whose population has dropped to six million. Ironically, they are turning towards countries deemed "abodes of unbelief" by the radical Salafist movement. This is a major PR disaster for IS, which to save face has slandered the refugees as having abandoned their religion, thereby committing apostasy (Zelin 2015) .
In addition, the reversal of the military expansion has caused serious financial difficulties for IS. Its income sources have dried up due to the lack of new territorial facilities as well as ployees within the Islamic State territory in September 2015, IS can no longer extract between 20 and 50 per cent of these salaries as it did before (Hinnant, Karam, and George 2016) .
The loss of these significant income sources may ultimately undermine the group's legitimacy, shifting it from a protector to a predator. Since December 2015, Raqqa has felt the grip of IS's monetary restrictions: salaries have been halved and electricity rationed, and prices for basic necessities are spiralling out of reach (Hinnant, Karam, and George 2016) . Analogous to the drop in revenues, IS is suffering from brain drain -for instance, in the field of qualified medical staff -and is now threatening experts that their property will be confiscated if they flee its domain (Al-Tamimi 2015) .
In light of the caliphate's recent decline, the attractiveness of joining it has dropped sig- 
The Further Brutalisation of Violence
These military backlashes and motivational setbacks have caused a strategic shift in IS's use of violence. It has steadily increased its brutality in order to fulfil its need to control its dominion, annihilate "disbelief," and enforce obedience. The strategic introduction of new forms of gruesome behaviour has served as a technique to deter its enemies and demand obedience from its own recruits. The group's brutal killings through the shooting, crucifixion, and the beheading of prisoners have lost their usefulness in deterring undesired behaviour due to their decreased shock value. As a consequence, IS has upped its brutality to re-establish the shock effect necessary to successfully deter its opponents. Execution videos and photographs now show killings that take the form of elaborate crucifixions, stoning, immolation, live burials, and death through multiple amputations. In June 2015, IS released a particularly gruesome video depicting its fighters committing heinous atrocities. They included the incineration, drowning, and blowing up of men who were still alive (Hubbard 2015; Siegel 2015: 14) .
This violence has also turned inwards. Inhabitants of Mosul reported in January 2016 that IS leaders had rounded up fighters who had escaped from the lost battle of Ramadi in a public square and set them alight for not fighting to their death (McKay 2016) . IS has also become increasingly paranoid about spies, hypocrites, and traitors. Thus, a climate of suspicion and mistrust has erupted within its ranks. Through its newfound brutality, the organisation wants to send an internal message that cheaters and spies will be punished without remorse. Violence is also applied to destroy sacred places and ancient sites. In its summer campaign of 2014, IS had already begun demolishing the ancient holy sites of religious communities it deemed idolatrous (Mamouri 2014) . In March 2015 it started destroying archaeological sites in the towns of Nimrud and Hatra in Iraq, artefacts at the Mosul Museum, and the Nergal Gate in the Assyrian city of Nineveh (Hartmann 2015) . While the proclaimed purpose of destroying antiquities is to rid the world of idols that serve "a nationalist agenda" and "to enrage the kuffār [infidels], a deed that in itself is beloved to Allah" (The Islamic State 1436a: 22), the iconoclasm clearly had an additional, strategic relevance as it happened shortly after the group's disastrous defeat in Kobane. With the ostentatious destruction of cultural world heritage, IS intended to catch the attention of Western media and flaunt its capacity to hit and hurt anytime, thereby compensating for its humiliating losses against the Kurdish militia in Kobane.
When it conquered the ancient ruins of Palmyra in Syria in May 2015, IS used the amphitheatre as a macabre arena for public executions. It then laced several shrines and temples with explosives, but instead of destroying them straightaway, it preserved them as a pawn for subsequent displays of power. It was after the loss of territory in northern Syria that IS
deemed it necessary to demonstrate its potential for action by blowing up the Arch of Triumph on 4 October 2015 (Shaheen 2015) . Much of this ferocity was addressed to a Western public. The escalation of shocking images ensured the attention of the world media. This attention is necessary if the IS is to maintain its claim to be the jihadist camp's vanguard and to safeguard its image of a winning team still capable of further victories. an ever-expanding Islamic empire attracted many foreign fighters and members of rival jihadist militias, enabling the group to further expand and to create a self-fulfilling prophecy by mobilising ever more holy warriors. The group's development from conducting underground insurgent activity to openly controlling whole cities and provinces provided IS with the distinct opportunity to split from conventional terrorist groups and portray itself as a state-building force. However, the group remained an intrinsically violent entity, as its very existence depended on permanent conquest. The latter enabled it to fulfil its eschatological mission and meet its economic requirements, which were supported by looting.
3) IS's militant expansionism and its use of gruesome violence caused outrage and resistance among the attacked and their allies. A broad international spectrum of actors stopped and reversed the conquest. Therefore, in its third stage, which began in 2015, IS is now trying to compensate for its failed enlargement with a strategy of brutalisation and by expanding its operating range with terrorist attacks. It is thereby proclaiming a fictitious expansion to compensate for failed conquests of new territory and to mask its real territorial decline. It intends to strike fear into the hearts of its opponents and those among its own fighters who might be considering abandoning the Islamic State.
IS's looming demise poses new threats, as it is now attempting to pursue its narrative of fulfilling a divine mission by opening up new front lines, inventing new atrocities in its videos, and perpetrating spectacular terrorist attacks worldwide. In doing so, it may delay but not reverse the demise of the Islamic State as a territorial unit. Most likely it will end up where it started, as an underground terrorist militia without territory and legitimacy, but with a legacy of unprecedented brutality.
IS has distinguished itself from other terrorist groups through its conquest of territory and its state-building process. At the same time, it has differed from liberation movements because it has not gained (or even attempted to gain) recognition and legitimacy from any major outside actor. IS has also failed to initiate a sustainable state-building process, instead building up a bandit state based on brute force and surprise forays into adjacent territories.
Furthermore, it does not justify the use of violence as a means to a political end, as terrorist or liberation movements do; rather, it holds violence sacred and legitimises its practice as a religious obligation. This, together with its binary codes of salvation and doom, its promise to fulfil a divine mission, and its radical zeal for breaking with the past for the sake of a millenarian new order, makes IS an apocalyptic organisation undertaking antinomian acts of violence that transgress Islamic legal rules (Kaplan and Costa 2015) . As the demise of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq and the related disempowerment of the caliphate is just a matter of time, the sect may survive in some hazardous pockets and derivations as a bestial terrorist underground movement that continues to massacre civilians. However, there is no future for an Islamic State without territory, and there is no authority for Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi without an Islamic State.
